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Bowman is a tiny, poverty-plagued town in Orangeburg County,
South Carolina, that has seen more than its fair share of trouble recently. 1
Although home to fewer than 1,200 residents,2 one dozen were registered
sex offenders in February 2010. 3  Its former police chief even pleaded
guilty in August 2009 to one count of misconduct in office after authorities
alleged he "showed pornographic materials to at least three teens while
serving as Bowman's top law enforcement officer"4 and used his position
of authority to unlawfully touch the children in a sexual manner. 5
. Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coit),
1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication,
Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks graduate students
Wendy Brunner, Kayla Gutierrez, Karla Kennedy, Christina Locke and Kara Camley Murrhee of
the University of Florida for reviewing a draft of this article during a seminar on media law
research. The author also thanks Marion B. Brechner for her support of both his research and the
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project that he directs.
1. See Citi-Data.com, Bowman, S.C., http://www.city-data.com/city/Bowman-South-
Carolina.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing a complete profile of the demographics of
the town and, among other things, noting that in 2008 more than 30 percent of its residents fell
below the poverty level, more than twice the rate for the state of South Carolina, that its estimated
median household income was $23,219--compared to $44,625 for the median household income
in all of South Carolina-and that its unemployment rate is above the state average).
2. Id.
3. See South Carolina Sex Offender Registry,
http://services.sled.sc.gov/sor/search.aspx?Type=City (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (entering
"Bowman" at the "City Name" prompt on this site revealed that twelve residents were listed as
registered sex offenders on October 5, 2009).
4. Ex-Police Chief Gets 3 Years Probation, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 14,
2009, at 2B.
5. As one local newspaper reported:
The charge is in connection with several allegations of misconduct over the two-
year period [Jason] Marchant was employed as Bowman's top law enforcement
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But perhaps Bowman's most notorious resident in 2009 was not a sex
offender, a corrupt government official, or even a person, for that matter. It
was, instead, a seemingly successful business 6 -the Lion's Den Adult
SuperStore #23-which proudly proclaims itself as "your one stop shop for
sexy adult fun. Shop for birthdays, anniversaries, bachelor or bachelorette
parties with our huge inventory. We carry all adult products from lingerie
to dvds, to toys and novelties." 7 The store, located just off of exit 159 on
Interstate 26 near a truck stop, 8 is part of a chain of more than forty adult
emporia "dedicated in providing the very best in adult videos, periodicals,
novelties, and intimate apparel." 9
It was not, however, the merchandise inside the store-it is legal to
sell vibrators in South Carolina, unlike in nearby Alabama l°-or even a
officer. At the time of his arrest in February 2006, Marchant was charged with
misconduct in office and four counts of providing obscene material to minors.
Those latter four charges were dismissed since they were included in the
misconduct allegations, which accused the former police officer of showing
pornographic material to at least three teenagers.
Richard Walker, Ex-Bowman Police Chief Pleads Guilty, TIMES & DEMOCRAT (Orangeburg,
S.C.), Aug. 13, 2009,
http://thetandd.com/articles/2009/08/13/news/doc4a838t fl da3ee 170155858.prt.
6. See Michael Gartland, Porn in the Bible Belt, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Feb.
6, 2005, at Fl (noting that the store employs about eight to ten people and offers health and dental
plans, as well as a 401(k) plan; quoting one employee for the proposition that the benefits are
"better than most places around here"; and quoting a woman who lives a few miles away from the
store for the proposition that it "gets a huge amount of business").
7. See Lion's Den Adult SuperStore #23-Bowman, South Carolina,
http://www.lionsdenadult.com/pages/storelocation/store23.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010)
(providing the quoted text that corresponds to this footnote, setting forth the address and phone
number of the store as, respectively, 2269 Homestead Road, Bowman, South Carolina, 29018,
and (803) 829-1781, and adding that it is located off of exit 159 on Interstate 26).
8. See Gartland, supra note 6, at F1 (reporting that the store is located near a "truck stop on
the other side of 1-26," and describing the building that houses the store as "squat and gray. Its
windows are blacked out. Across the street stands an ancient-looking grain silo surrounded by
dirt fields and rows of leafless trees. Cars and trailers whiz by on Interstate 26 about an eighth of
a mile away.").
9. See The Lion's Den, About Our Company,
http://www.lionsdenadult.com/pages/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (setting forth not
only a description of the company, but also its vision and mission statements).
10. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2009) (providing, in relevant part, that "it shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or
agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value" and making it a
crime for wholesalers "to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree
to distribute, for the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at retail, any obscene material
or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs for anything of pecuniary value") (emphasis added). The statute was upheld as
constitutional in 2007 by a federal appellate court. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1324
(1 th Cir. 2007).
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visit to it by adult-film star Flower Tucci1 in April 2009 that caught the
attention of law enforcement officials. 12 It was, instead, the store's six off-
site billboards located near Interstates 26 and 95 13 that drew their wrath in
Carolina Pride, Inc. v. McMaster. 14 The signs, of course, also "drew many
of its customers and constituted one of its principal means of
advertising." 15
The billboards, however, didn't feature photographs of any naked or
scantily clad women. 16 Likewise, they didn't have images of sex toys or
various and sundry adult novelties. 17 In fact, as described by U.S. District
Judge Cameron McGowan Currie, the billboards were relatively stark, text-
only ads, except for "an outline of the profile of a lion." 18 They merely
conveyed "the existence and location of The Lion's Den" 19 and simply let
drivers know that it was "an adult book store." 20 In other words, they were
a far cry from the so-called "boob billboard ' 2' for a Platinum strip club in
Rosedale, New York, that in 2009 caused a commotion with its fifty-foot
image of a buxom woman wearing little more than "a miniscule, black
leather S&M strap pulled across nipples." 
22
So what was wrong with the tame Lion's Den billboards? They
violated a South Carolina statute providing that "an off-premises, outdoor
advertising sign 2 3 for an adult or sexually-oriented business24 may not be
11. Tucci is "the star of Flower's Squirt Shower, the recipient of the AVN awards for Best
Specialty Series-Squirting and Best Specialty Release-Squirting in 2007 and 2008. She was
also repeatedly featured on the hit Showtime series 'Family Business' with Seymore Butts."
Flower Tucci Signing for Elegant Angel, Premiere Sales Group in Ga., AVN.COM, Mar. 23,
2009, http://business.avn.com/company-news/31374.html.
12. See The Lion's Den, Past Lion's Den Events,
http://www.lionsdenadult.com/pages/storepromos.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (describing
Tucci's appearances in 2009).
13. See Carolina Pride, Inc. v. McMaster (Carolina Pride 1), No. 3:08-04016-CMC, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300, *4 (D. S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (observing that the store "advertises the
existence and location of The Lion's Den on six off-site outdoor advertising signs. Each of these
signs is located within one mile of a public highway (Interstate highways 1-26 and 1-95)").
14. Id. at *4 n.5.
15. Fred Horlbeck, U.S. District Court Strikes Down Ban on Adult-Oriented Billboards,
S.C. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 24, 2009.
16. Carolina Pride I, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300, at *4 n.5 (describing the images
featured on the billboard at issue).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *4.
20. Id.
21. Linda Stasi, Tempest in a D-Cup-A Strip-Club Sign Riles Queens-And Busts Up My
Family, N.Y. POST, Feb. 15, 2009, at 25.
22. Id.
23. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-25-120(3) (2008) (providing that an 'outdoor advertising
2010l
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located within one mile of a public highway.",25 The regulation stemmed
from a bill 26 that actually was vetoed by South Carolina Governor Mark
Sanford 27-he would later face his own sexually oriented problems 28-but
took effect in 2006 when he was overridden by both the South Carolina
House and Senate. 29
Citing First Amendment 30 free-speech concerns, Judge Currie first
issued a preliminary injunction against the law in early 200931 and then
granted a permanent injunction stopping its enforcement in August 2009.32
His twin decisions mirror those in other recent opinions striking down
similar billboard laws targeting adult businesses; these include a June 2009
decision by U.S. District Judge Julie A. Robinson in Abilene Retail # 30,
Inc. v. Six, 33 stopping Kansas from enforcing a statute that provides:
No sign or other outdoor advertising, for an adult cabaret 34 or
sign' means an outdoor sign, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, plaque, poster,
billboard, or other thing which is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, or any part of
the advertising or its informative contents").
24. See id. § 57-25-120(9) (defining a sexually oriented business as one "offering its patrons
goods of which a substantial portion are sexually-oriented materials. A business in which more
than ten percent of the display space is used for sexually-oriented materials is presumed to be a
sexually-oriented business").
25. Id. § 57-25-145.
26. H.B. 3381, 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006). The original version of the bill did not include the
provision targeting billboards for sexually oriented businesses. See John Frank, Billboard
Legislation Opponents Look for Signs of Veto, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 1, 2006,
at 3B.
27. Editorial, Shameful Vote on Billboards, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 24,
2009, at A10.
28. See generally Philip Rucker, In S.C., Governor's Wife is 'the Hero in This Story',
WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at A3 (describing Sanford's "affair with an Argentine woman" that
caused "a sex scandal that gripped the nation and embarrassed his state").
29. See Editorial, supra note 27, at AI0. Sanford complained that the bill "trumps local
government, which should be the regulatory authority on local matters within its jurisdiction.
And he pointed out that the requirements upon local government are more stringent than those
related to billboard management by state agencies." See Kirsten Singleton, Lawmakers, Sanford
Bicker Over Budget, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), Feb. 25, 2006, at 6B (describing the override of the
veto of the bill).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press." Id. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated eighty-five years
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
31. See Carolina Pride !, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300.
32. See id. at *I 1 (concluding that "the Sign Statute violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment" and
declaring it "unconstitutional on its face and as applied to" the owner of the Lion's Den store).
33. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1199 (D. Kan. 2009).
34. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2255(a)(1) (2008) (defining an adult cabaret as "a nightclub,
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sexually-oriented business 35 shall be located within one mile of any state
highway except if such business is located within one mile of a state
highway then the business may display a maximum of two exterior signs
on the premises of the business, consisting of one identification sign and
one sign solely giving notice that the premises are off limits to minors. 36
And just as in Carolina Pride, the Kansas dispute was brought by the
owner of a rural Lion's Den store 37 that had billboards near a major
interstate with "no pictures or drawings and advertise[d] only the store's
name, location and logo." 
38
The decisions in Carolina Pride and Abilene Retail followed on the
heels of a 2006 opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit declaring unconstitutional a Missouri statute 39 that also
targeted billboards located within one mile of state highways. 40 The high
court of Georgia had reached the same conclusion about a similar law in
1998.41
Just as legislative bodies continue to pass unconstitutional laws
limiting minors' access to violent video games despite a tall wall of
precedent against them, 42 lawmakers out to halt billboards targeting adult
businesses seem to ignore precedent and persist in crafting patently
bar, restaurant or similar commercial establishment" that regularly features nudity or semi-nudity
or live performances "characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas or by specified
sexual activities").
35. See id. § 68-2255(a)(4) (defining a sexually oriented business as "any business which
offers its patrons goods of which a substantial portion are sexually-oriented materials. Any
business where more than 10% of display space is used for sexually-oriented materials shall be
presumed to be a sexually-oriented business").
36. Id. § 68-2255(b).
37. In this case, the Lion's Den store is located near Interstate 70 in Abilene, Kansas, in
what used to be "a Stuckey's truck stop." The store, which sells "[l]otions, lingerie, oils, toys,
movies, DVDs, [and] magazines," drew protests when it opened, with a group of people standing
"across the street from the store, holding signs aimed at truck drivers. The signs said, 'Think
again, or we report."' Weekend All Things Considered: Abilene, Kansas, Fights Adult Business
in the Town (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 3, 2004).
38. Assoc. Press, Judge Blocks Adult Store Sign Law, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J. (Kan.), June 30,
2009, at Al.
39. MO. REV. STAT. § 226.531 (2006).
40. Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2006).
41. State v. Caf& Erotica, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 732, 735 (Ga. 1998).
42. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that California's violent video game statute "violates rights protected by the First
Amendment because the State has not demonstrated a compelling interest, has not tailored the
restriction to its alleged compelling interest, and there exist less-restrictive means that would
further the State's expressed interests"); see generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Violence and Video Games 2006: Legislation and Litigation, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 49
(2007) (providing an overview of laws that have been struck down in this area).
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unconstitutional laws. Indeed, in October 2009, a bill 43 was moving its
way through the legislature in Michigan that would limit billboards for
sexually oriented businesses, although it is more narrowly tailored 44 than
those struck down to date. 4
As Lion's Den superstores proliferate in small towns, bringing their
own brand of "freeway porn" 46 to crossroads truckers and motorists in rural
America, the fight over adult-store billboards is not likely to disappear
soon. In fact, as USA Today reported, "[i]n every town where the Lion's
Den has opened, the new stores have faced opposition, including court
challenges.",47  The Omaha World Herald noted that adult stores "are
increasingly common on the nation's rural Interstate highways, where they
find relatively cheap land, few zoning restrictions and a steady stream of
potential customers." 
48
It is not just billboards for adult stores, however, that are the object of
legislative ire today. In June 2009, Congress passed a bill giving the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration the authority to ban outdoor advertising for
tobacco products near schools and playgrounds. 49  That same month,
43. S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
44. The bill, as passed by the state Senate on Aug. 19, 2009, allows billboards for sexually
oriented businesses, provided they are in a text-only format (words and numbers and a registered
corporate trademark are the only items allowed on the billboard). S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2009). This bill is addressed in more detail later in this article, infra notes 296-303 and
accompanying text.
45. See Ron Barnett, Bill Aims at Bawdy Billboards, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2009, at 3A
(describing a bill introduced by Michigan state Senator Tupac Hunter and passed in the state
Senate in August 2009).
46. See Debbie Howlett, Sex Shops Infiltrate Small Towns, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2003, at
3A (using the term "freeway porn" and describing Lion's Den as "a national chain based in
Columbus, Ohio. Nine of its 29 stores have opened in the past two years. Eight are in or near
towns of 16,000 or fewer residents. All of them are just off an interstate.").
47. Id.
48. John Ferak, Adult Stores Making More Interstate Exits X-Rated, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Feb. 1, 2004, at IA.
49. In particular, the newly adopted Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
of 2009 provides that within 180 days of its enactment, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall publish in the Federal Register a final rule regarding cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco that will "include such modifications to section 897.30(b), if any, that the Secretary
determines are appropriate in light of governing First Amendment case law, including the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (533 U.S.
525 (2001))." Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102, 123 Stat. 1776, 1830-31 (2009); 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1
(2009).
Section 897.30(b), in turn, is a 1996 rule adopted by the Food & Drug Administration-but never
enforced due to the Supreme Court's decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000)-providing that "[n]o outdoor advertising for cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco, including billboards, posters, or placards, may be placed within 1,000 feet of the
perimeter of any public playground or playground area in a public park (e.g., a public park with
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President Barack Obama, himself a smoker, 50 signed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 51 into law. He claimed it would "save
American lives" and protect children from the "constant and insidious
barrage of advertising where they live, where they learn, and where they
play." 
52
In line with the recent decisions involving highway-contiguous
billboards for adult stores, 53 however, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001 in
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly54  declared unconstitutional a
Massachusetts law that prohibited outdoor advertising for smokeless
tobacco or cigar products within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or
playground. 5 5 The nation's high court observed:
The State's interest in preventing underage tobacco use is
substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the
sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity.
We must consider that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have
an interest in conveying truthful information about their
products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in
receiving truthful information about tobacco products. 
56
Not surprisingly, several leading tobacco companies already are
challenging provisions of the new law, including those affecting billboard
equipment such as swings and seesaws, baseball diamonds, or basketball courts), elementary
school, or secondary school." 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44617 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to have been codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897.30(b)). When linked together, these two provisions mean that the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to try to rework the original 1,000-foot proposal in such a way as to make it
constitutional.
See Jim Abrams, FDA Gets Hands on Tobacco, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), June 12, 2009,
at Al (reporting the bill "bans billboards close to schools"); Janet Hook, FDA Set to Get Tobacco
Powers, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2009, at At (reporting the bill "bans billboards close to schools");
and Duff Wilson, Tobacco Regulation Is Expected To Face a Free-Speech Challenge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2009, at BI (discussing the measure).
50. See Jeff Zeleny, For Obama, Tough Grip By Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at
A12 (describing how Obama admits to smoking); and House Approves Federal Regulation of
Tobacco, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Apr. 3, 2009, at Al (reporting that "President
Barack Obama has spoken publicly about his own struggles to kick a smoking habit").
51. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333, 15
U.S.C. § 4402 and 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 (2009)).
52. Philip Elliott, Obama Signs Strong Anti-Smoking Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 2009,
at A6.
53. Supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
54. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
55. Id. at 565 (concluding that Massachusetts "has failed to show that the outdoor
advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to
advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use").
56. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
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advertising, in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States. 57 As the
plaintiffs stated in their August 2009 complaint, the new law "resurrects a
ban on outdoor advertising similar to the one invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lorillard." 
58
This article examines the regulation of billboard advertising for what
might be considered the vice products of sexual entertainment content and
tobacco-related goods. Part I of the article: (a) establishes important
foundational steps to a First Amendment inquiry into the censorship of
billboards for adult stores and tobacco products; (b) analyzes why
legislators target such content for censorship; and (c) exposes the flaws
with such rationales including what the author dubs the secondary
secondary-effects doctrine. Next, Part II provides a brief overview of the
commercial speech doctrine that sets forth the analytical framework for
considering whether regulations affecting billboard advertising for sexually
oriented businesses, which sometimes are referred to by the perhaps
appropriate acronym of SOBs,59 and tobacco products pass constitutional
muster. Part III then explains how courts have applied the rules of the
commercial speech doctrine to specific instances of billboard censorship.
Much greater emphasis is paid in this article to the regulation of billboards
advertising SOBs, given the relative paucity of professorial scholarship in
this area. Finally, Part IV concludes the article by analyzing a pending
piece of billboard legislation from Michigan and suggesting specific ways
it might be re-drafted in order to stand a better chance of surviving
constitutional scrutiny. In addition, Part IV exposes other issues tied to
billboard legislation, from the fiscal realities of challenging billboard laws
to the cultural realities of life in a sex-saturated society. Significantly, this
article does not include a separate literature review but rather incorporates
legal scholarship and judicial precedent directly into each of the
aforementioned parts.
57. Complaint at 23, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09-CV-00117-
JHM-ERG (W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://static.mgnetwork.com/rtd/pdfs/complaint.pdf [hereinafter Commonwealth Brands
Complaint].
58. Id.
59. See Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, The Free Speech Coalition & Adult Entertainment:
An Inside View of the Adult Entertainment Industry, Its Leading Advocate & the First
Amendment, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 247, 251 (2004) (providing that "municipalities
across the United States today are stepping up efforts both to zone the locations of sexually
oriented businesses-entities sometimes known by the double entendre-laden acronym SOBs-
and to regulate the activities inside them) (emphasis added).
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS VS. THE REASONS FOR
CENSORING SIN ADVERTISING
This part of the article is divided into two sections. The first sets forth some
basic principles of First Amendment jurisprudence that are necessary to
contextualize and understand the controversies surrounding the censorship of
billboards that advertise sexually oriented businesses and tobacco-related products.
The second section provides an overview of the justifications and rationales for the
censorship in these two areas; it also critiques these rationales.
A. The First Amendment Fundamentals
Initially, it is important to establish a foundation for a First
Amendment inquiry into the censorship of the billboards at issue in this
article. This occurs below through a progression of several steps.
First, it is clear today that non-obscene,
60 non-child pornographic 61
sexual content is protected by the First Amendment. 62  Thus, unless an
adult store like the Lion's Den is peddling obscene content or child
pornography, it is engaged in selling lawful products that adults are free to
purchase if they so choose. 63 As Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of the
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Frank Easterbrook wryly wrote in
September 2009 when considering a zoning ordinance affecting adult
60. Obscenity is one of the few categories of expression that is not protected by the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(stating that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
61. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the distribution and possession of child
pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1836 (2008) (writing that "we have held that a statute which proscribes the
distribution of all child pornography, even material that does not qualify as obscenity, does not on
its face violate the First Amendment" and that "we have held that the government may
criminalize the possession of child pornography, even though it may not criminalize the mere
possession of obscene material involving adults"); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 245-46 (2002) (providing that "[a]s a general principle, the First Amendment bars the
government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its
limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement,
obscenity, and pornography produced with real children") (emphasis added).
62. See Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (writing that "sexual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment").
63. It should be noted that if such a sexually oriented business also features nude or nearly
nude dancing, that genre of dancing too has been held to be a form of "expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment." Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566
(1991). It is not, however, a violation of free speech to require minimal clothing on dancers. See
id. at 565 (concluding that an Indiana law requiring dancers the dancers to "wear pasties and G-
strings does not violate the First Amendment").
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bookstores, "the sellers of books and movies enjoy constitutional
protections that sellers of snow shovels, shoes, and parakeets do not." 
64
States may, however, prohibit minors from purchasing such non-obscene
sexual content 65 under the concept of "variable obscenity." 66
Second, cigarettes are lawful for adults to purchase. The U.S.
Supreme Court, for instance, observed in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly
that the government's "interest in preventing underage tobacco use is
substantial, and even compelling, but it is no less true that the sale and use
of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity.' 67 But just as with non-
obscene sexual content, it is permissible for states to ban minors' access to
purchase tobacco products. 68 As USA Today recently reported, "all 50
states and the District of Columbia are in compliance with the Synar
Amendment, a federal regulation that aims to reduce young people's access
to tobacco by requiring states to implement laws and other programs that
limit the sale of tobacco to minors." 
69
Third, when one jointly considers the first two points above, it
becomes clear that the regulation of billboards advertising sexually oriented
businesses and tobacco-related products constitutes an effort to limit access
64. New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2009).
65. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968) (upholding a New York law that
"prohibits the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis
of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults").
66. As one federal district court succinctly explained it:
The Supreme Court has approved prohibiting a minor's access to sexually oriented
magazines, even though those magazines were not obscene as to adults but were as
to minors. This has become known as the concept of variable obscenity. Minors
have a more restricted right than adults to sexually oriented material. It is
permissible to determine what minors may view with reference to prevailing
standards in the adult community with respect to what is suitable for minors.
Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Schiff, 649 F. Supp. 1009, 1018, n.10 (D. N.M. 1986) (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted). Variable obscenity is also sometimes referred to as "obscenity
as to minors." Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir.
2009).
67. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (emphasis added).
68. Joni Hersch, Risks: Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DuKE
L.J. 1143, 1150 (1998) (noting that "by 1995, the minimum age for legal sale of tobacco products
was eighteen in all states, with higher minimum ages in four states").
69. Jillian Berman, 'Substantial Reduction' in Tobacco Sales to Minors, USA TODAY, Aug.
11, 2009, at lOB. The Synar Amendment:
enacted in 1992, requires that every state, as a condition for receiving federal
substance abuse block grants, must have in place a law forbidding sales of tobacco
products to anyone under the age of eighteen and must commit to a program for
active enforcement of the prohibition, including random, unannounced compliance
checks on retailers.
Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson, Local and State Regulation of Tobacco: The Effects of
the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87, 108 (1998).
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to information-in particular, truthful information, such as the existence
and location of an adult business-about lawful goods that adults have the
right to purchase but that minors do not. It is recognition of this situation
that creates the legal quandary. In his 1992 book Free Speech in an Open
Society, current Washington and Lee University School of Law Dean
Rodney A. Smolla identified what he called "the perplexing problem" of
"whether the First Amendment should permit controls on the speech of
adults to adults in the general marketplace merely because children may be
exposed to the message." 70 Indeed, that appears to be the situation with the
types of billboards discussed in this article-they are created by adults (or
by business entities run by adults) to convey messages to adults, but, as
illustrated later, there is concern that children should not be exposed to
them.
Fourth, there are two sets of First Amendment stakeholders involved
in the billboard cases:
- those of the businesses that want to convey information about
themselves; and
- those of the people who might be interested in their products. 71
In other words, there are both speakers' rights and audiences' rights
at stake, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there is an
unenumerated First Amendment right to receive speech. 72 As the Court
wrote in Griswold v. Connecticut, "the State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the
right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive,
[and] the right to read."73 The "spectrum of ... knowledge" 74 about the
location of lawful businesses and lawful products is diminished for adults
by the billboard laws at the heart of this article.
Fifth, in resolving the problem identified above by Dean Smolla, 75 it
is clear that shielding minors from material that simply may offend their
sensibilities (or at least their sensibilities, as imagined by legislators and/or
70. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 329 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992).
71. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 243 (2002) (deciding First
Amendment claims brought by the publisher of a book advocating the nudist lifestyle, a painter of
nudes, and a photographer, among others); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212
(1975) (considering as part of the First Amendment claim the ability of adults at a drive-in movie
theatre to view nudity on screen).
72. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Smolla, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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parents) will not, standing alone, be a sufficient justification to overcome
First Amendment concerns. In other words, the fact that some people may
find sexually oriented businesses offensive and, therefore, try to shield
minors from their very existence, will not justify censorship. 76
More than three decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville considered, against a First Amendment challenge, the
"validity of a Jacksonville, Fla., ordinance that prohibits showing films
containing nudity by a drive-in movie theater when its screen is visible
from a public street or place." 77 The city argued that "it may protect its
citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that may be offensive."
7 8
The high court, however, rejected this argument.79 It reasoned that
"much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and
moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit
government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer." 80 Significantly, the Court added that any person who might be
offended by nudity on a drive-in movie screen already had as sufficient
remedy-he "can avert his eyes.",8' This, of course, echoes the sentiment
of the high court in Cohen v. California that when people are in a public
place, they possess a lesser privacy expectation of being shielded from
unwanted messages 82 and they can "effectively avoid further bombardment
of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." 83 In articulating a
principle that surely is relevant to efforts to ban ads about lawful products,
the Court in Cohen wrote:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in
other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
76. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text (explaining this proposition).
77. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975).
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id. at 210.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 212.
82. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (reasoning that "while it may be
that one has a more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through a
courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central Park, surely it is nothing like the
interest in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one's own home").
83. Id. at21.
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predilections. 
84
In other words, the government should not be able to shut off the
billboard-conveyed speech of tobacco companies or SOBs along public
highways without first proving that the billboards are so intolerable that
they interfere with substantial privacy interests. When one is in a public
place or on a public highway, however, one has no reasonable expectation
of privacy.85  The statement in Cohen that "[a]ny broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections" 86 taps directly into the notion
that the personal views of lawmakers or the majority of citizens about
SOBs should not be allowed to silence the speech of such SOBs and, in
turn, stifle the right of the minority of people who frequent them to receive
that speech.
Of particular importance to the possible argument that minors should
be shielded from billboards for sexually oriented businesses, the Supreme
Court in Erznoznick noted that while "a State or municipality can adopt
more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths
than on those available to adults," it is equally true that "minors are entitled
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection., 87  Here the
ordinance banning all nudity was simply too broad, 88 and the Court
stressed that:
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body
thinks unsuitable for them. In most circumstances, the values
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when
84. Id.
85. See Good v. Borough of Steelton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76820, at *36 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
30, 2008) (observing that "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place");
Rodriguez v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 20, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reasoning that a person has "no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the public street").
86. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
87. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
88. See J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. Dragani, 538 F.3d 379, 383 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that "[t]he
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the government from proscribing a 'substantial' amount of
constitutionally protected speech judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," and
adding that the "[o]verbreadth doctrine exists to allay the concern that the threat of enforcement
of an overbroad law may deter or chill constitutionally protected speech-especially when the law
provides criminal sanctions"). See generally John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First
Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 (2004) (providing an excellent overview of the overbreadth
doctrine, including its use in both First Amendment situations and other contexts); Richard H.
Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1990-91) (providing a critical
examination of the overbreadth doctrine and suggesting ways to improve it).
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government seeks to control the flow of information to minors. 
89
In a nutshell, "speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects
offending our sensibilities," as the Supreme Court opined in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition9" in 2002. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court
observed more than a half-century ago in Butler v. Michigan91 that the
government cannot "reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is
fit for children." 92 In 2002, the high court reiterated this maxim, calling it
an "important First Amendment principle." 93
When enacting the SOB billboard law struck down in Carolina Pride,
however, the South Carolina legislature specifically inserted language on
January 26, 2006 into its official findings that the measure was intended to
"mitigate the adverse secondary effects of sexually-oriented businesses and
limit harm to minors." 94 Likewise, the Kansas legislature cited the desire
"to limit harm to minors" 95 when it enacted the law struck down in Abilene
Retail. 96 Clearly, there would be no physical or psychological harm to
minors by seeing a text-only billboard advertising an adult bookstore; the
only possible harm to minors would be one of moral offense at the notion
that such sexually-oriented businesses exist and, in turn, that minors would
learn at too early an age about this supposedly sordid reality. While
typically today one might think of a country like China invoking the
defense of its "public morals"9 7 in order to quash speech it finds offensive,
the Alabama Supreme Court in September 2009 upheld a state law banning
the sale of sexual devices, reasoning that, despite the decision in Lawrence
v. Texas, 98 "public morality can still serve as a legitimate rational basis for
89. See Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 213-14 (footnote omitted).
90. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
91. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
92. Id. at 383.
93. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 252.
94. H. 3381, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (amended, as passed by
Senate), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess 116_2005-
2006/prever/3381_20060126.htm (emphasis added).
95. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2255 (e) (1) (2008), available at
http://www.kslegislature.org/legsrv-statutes/getStatute.do?number=28682 (providing that the
billboard law was designed to: (1) "mitigate the adverse secondary effects of sexually-oriented
businesses; (2) to improve traffic safety; (3) to limit harm to minors; and (4) to reduce
prostitution, crime, juvenile delinquency, deterioration in property values and lethargy in
neighborhood improvement efforts") (emphasis added).
96. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Abilene Retail decision).
97. See Richard Verrier & David Pierson, Setback for US. Films in China, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2009, at BI (reporting on China's desire "to protect public morals [by] restricting
imports of movies, music and books").
98. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the nation's high court struck
down a Texas anti-sodomy statute that prohibited, among other things, consensual sexual
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regulating commercial activity." 
99
Even in today's high-tech digital world, billboards are an important
mechanism for speech transmission. 100 As attorney Darrel Menthe argues,
"billboards are increasingly the most reliable means of communicating with
a public that spends more time on the road, but no longer watches
television commercials or listens to radio advertisements." 101 Predictably,
such regulations raise traditional First Amendment issues.
The next section further explores the reasons for censoring billboards
that advertise adult businesses and tobacco-related products.
B. Reasons for Squelching Billboards for SOBs and Tobacco Products
The first part of this section addresses the reasons for suppressing
billboards advertising SOBs, while the second part addresses the
justifications for thwarting tobacco-related billboards.
1. Billboards for Sexually Oriented Businesses
When it comes to laws that forbid highway-proximate billboards that
advertise the location and existence of sexually-oriented businesses, the
primary legislative justifications are to:
" protect minors 102; and
" force adult stores out of business. 103
Section A, supra, already identified problems with the first of these
two justifications. 104 At this point, then, it is simply worth noting that a
minor does not suffer physical harm by reading a text-only billboard for an
SOB; billboards don't punch minors. Likewise, the states have offered no
evidence-at least none is set forth in the legislative records-of any social
intercourse by gay men, reasoning that the "State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime." Id. at 578.
99. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 2009 Ala. LEXIS 209, at *68-69
(Ala. Sept. 11, 2009).
100. See Darrel Menthe, Writing on the Wall: The Impending Demise of Modern Sign
Regulation Under the First Amendment and State Constitutions, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (recognizing that billboards are making a comeback even "[a]midst the
communications revolution of inexpensive broadband Internet and five-hundred channels of
television programming").
101. Id.
102. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251-52 (2002); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
103. See, J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. Dragani, 538 F.3d 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2008).
104. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation of speech in
order to protect minors from it).
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science studies demonstrating that a child who views a text-only billboard
for an SOB suffers psychological harm. '05 A billboard announcing the
presence of a strip club simply is not like the "girlie" 106 magazines at issue
in Ginsberg v. New York 107 that contained images of female nudity (which,
unlike a billboard posted on a highway viewed by speeding cars, could be
viewed repeatedly and up close) and that led to the variable obscenity
doctrine noted earlier. 108
The first justification, then, boils down to moral offense or shielding
minors from the existence of a business that adults, holding positions of
government authority, believe is wrong. But legislators cannot, as one
federal appellate court put it, "undermine the First Amendment rights of
minors willy-nilly under the guise of promoting parental authority." 109
And as the Supreme Court observed, "minors are entitled to a significant
measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them." 10 In sum, if it is constitutional for children
to be exposed briefly to a jacket carrying the explicit message "Fuck the
Draft" in a public location, "' then it should be constitutionally permissible
for them to be exposed briefly to a non-explicit message that provides a
business's name and location.
The logic chain for the second justification--driving adult stores out
of business-is fairly easy to understand. As stated in Passions Video, Inc.
v. Nixon 112 when considering Missouri's statute targeting adult-store
billboards:
The state argues that its ultimate goal is to reduce the adverse
secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses by limiting the presence
of sexually oriented businesses. Under that theory, restricting the amount
of advertising by the affected businesses would reduce the number of
customers that patronize the affected business, thus reducing profits, and
ultimately forcing the affected business to close. 113
105. The author of this article could locate no studies showing direct causation of injury
from such billboards.
106. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968).
107. Id.
108. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of variable
obscenity).
109. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.
2003).
110. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975).
111. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
112. 458 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2006).
113. Id. at 842.
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Simply put, fewer ads -> fewer customers "- less revenue "- closure.
Phrased differently, if no one knows that a business exists, then no one can
shop there and the business's failure to make revenue inevitably causes the
business to shut down. The government wins, garnering its desired result
and, apparently, tolerating the by-product of unemployment as the SOB's
employees lose theirjobs.
The notion of "secondary effects" 114 allegedly caused by adult
establishments is a common, yet highly controversial, 115 justification for
zoning these types of businesses. 116 As Professor Daniel Farber describes
it, "a secondary effect is a kind of side-effect of speech that happens to be
associated with particular types of content." 117 Professor Daniel Linz and
his colleagues write that "secondary effects have most often included
alleged increases in crime, decreases in property values, and other
indicators of neighborhood deterioration in the area surrounding the adult
business." 118  Secondary effects blamed on adult bookstores have even
included "pornographic litter." '19
Citing secondary effects is a popular tactic when zoning SOBs
because, as one federal appellate court recently observed, "when the
purpose of an adult entertainment ordinance is to ameliorate the secondary
effects of adult businesses, intermediate scrutiny applies" 120 rather than the
more rigorous strict scrutiny standard 121 that typically applies when
114. Id.
115. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 115 (2d ed. 2006); Daniel R. Aaronson et al., The First Amendment in Chaos: How
the Law of Secondary Effects is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 741 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Independence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a Charlotte, North Carolina zoning ordinance that was designed to prevent the
secondary effects supposedly caused by adult establishments); 729, Inc. v. Kenton County Fiscal
Ct., 515 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding, on the grounds of reducing the alleged secondary
effect of prostitution, part of a municipal ordinance barring entertainers at sexually oriented
businesses "from entering areas of an establishment occupied by customers within one hour of the
entertainers' performing semi-nude on stage"); D.H.L. Assocs. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50 (lst
Cir. 1999) (upholding a zoning ordinance in the town of Tyngsborough, Massachusetts, that was
justified on the interest of reducing negative secondary effects allegedly caused by adult
entertainment establishments).
117. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1998).
118. Bryant Paul, David Linz & Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation of "Adult"
Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative
Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 355,356 (2001).
119. World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir.
2004).
120. Zibtluda, LLC v. Gwinnett County, 411 F.3d 1278, 1284 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
121. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (writing
that a "content-based speech restriction [is permissible] only if it satisfies strict scrutiny," which
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reviewing the constitutionality of content-based laws. 122 As Justice
Anthony Kennedy reasoned in his critical concurrence in the adult-business
zoning case of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 123 "[a] zoning
restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech
should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny." 124 Thus, as
Shima Baradaran-Robison explained in a law journal article:
[C]ities are able to zone adult businesses in order to deal with
the effects of these businesses rather than to regulate the content
of the speech expressed by the businesses. So, cities can zone
adult businesses because, for example, they cause a decline in
the quality of urban neighborhoods and increase prostitution, but
not because a city disapproves of nude dancing as
entertainment. 125
Although a complete analysis of the secondary effects doctrine is
beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that it is
controversial. 126 This is true partly because, as Professors Russell Weaver
and Donald Lively assert, it creates "the possibility that content will be a
primary rather than subordinate consideration in support of regulatory
initiative" 127 and there can be a "problem in discerning the real regulatory
concern." 128 Furthermore, as Florida-based adult entertainment attorney
Daniel Aaronson and his colleagues pointed out in a 2009 law journal
article, "[t]he law of secondary effects is a mess l29 [and it] is both confused
and intellectually dishonest; the federal circuits are split on issues both
large and small, and the guidance offered to lower courts resembles
requires that the law in question "be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest"); Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (explaining that the
government may "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest").
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 903 (2d
ed. 2002) (writing that "content-based discrimination must meet strict scrutiny").
122. See generally Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both
Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801
(2004) (providing an excellent overview of the sometimes slippery distinctions between content-
neutral and content-based laws).
123. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
124. Id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment
Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 449 (2004).
126. See generally WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 115, at 115; Aaronson et al., supra note
115, at 741.
127. WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 115, at 115.
128. Id.
129. Aaronson et al., supra note 115, at 741.
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instructions for operating a Ouija board." 130
The text of the Missouri billboard statute held to be
unconstitutional 131 specifically proclaimed that it was designed, in part, "to
mitigate the adverse secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses." 132
Identical language, except for an added hyphen, appears in the failed
Kansas law. 133 Finally, when South Carolina adopted its now-enjoined
statutory prohibition on billboards for adult stores within one mile of
highways in 2006, it also amended the corresponding statutory declaration
of purpose to reflect the legislature's desire to "mitigate the adverse
secondary effects of sexually-oriented businesses and limit harm to
minors." 134
Viewed in this light, the author of this article contends that what these
states really are asserting is what might be thought of as, to coin a phrase, a
"secondary secondary-effects argument." 135 In particular, the billboards do
not actually cause any of the secondary effects about which the states are
concerned. Rather, the states are interested in secondary effects of the
SOBs, not the billboards. 136 A billboard does not bring with it
pornographic litter, crime, or decreased property values. It is the specific
content of the message on a billboard-a message identifying the existence
and location of an SOB-that might (but need not) motivate a person to
find an SOB. The billboard, thus, is one step removed from the actual
source of the secondary effects-the SOB:
Message on Billboard "- Causes Behavior (driving to SOB) --> SOB
Causes Secondary Effects (crime, litter, lower property values)
Accordingly, the "secondary secondary-effects" argument used in
states like Missouri, Kansas and South Carolina to justify their SOB-
billboard laws is ultimately flawed. It is not a content-neutral justification
but, rather, a content-based one that should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny. 131 Why? Because the governments that attempt to ban billboards
on this ground are concerned about the primary effect of the message on the
audience-namely, that the messages regarding the presence and location
130. Id.
131. Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2006).
132. Mo. REV. STAT. § 226.531 (2006).
133. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2255 (e)(1)(2008) (providing that the law was enacted, in
part, "[t]o mitigate the adverse secondary effects of sexually-oriented businesses").
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-25-130 (2009).
135. The author could not locate either a judicial opinion or law journal article using this
phrase, as of February 10, 2010, when this article was last reviewed by the author before going to
press.
136. See Bryant Paul et al., supra note 118, at 356.
137. Supra note 122.
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of an SOB will impact the billboard readers' conduct by influencing them
to turn off an exit from a freeway and to visit an SOB. 138 Primary effects
are the effects on the audience (in this case, a highway driver) when
viewing a message. 139 As Professor John Fee recently observed: "[T]he
direct communicative effects of speech on audience members are always
primary effects. These include persuasion, offense, changed social
attitudes, changed desires and emotions, and even sexual arousal." 140 The
billboards for SOBs, for instance, may persuade a driver to visit them.
Conversely, a secondary effect of a billboard, as Justice Kennedy
observed in 2002 in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 141 occurs
when it "may obstruct a view." 142 Here, the content of the billboard makes
no difference at all. It is both the sheer size and opaque nature of
billboards that impede views, regardless of the words that may be painted
or pasted on it.
All billboards, of course, block views, but the laws in South
Carolina, 143 Kansas 144 and Missouri 145 targeted only certain billboards
conveying certain messages-namely, those of sexually oriented
businesses-because of their persuasive impact, not their view-obstructing
effect. 146 This distinguishes them from content-neutral billboard laws that
"apply evenhandedly to commercial and non-commercial speech" 147 and
that "discriminate against no viewpoint or subject matter." 148 The bottom
line, then, is that the secondary secondary-effects argument mounted in the
SOB billboard case is both flawed and disingenuous. Recognition of this
problem, in turn, might help to stem the tide of what one legal scholar has
138. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (observing, in the context of
a law banning public nudity (including nude dancing), that "the ordinance does not attempt to
regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of watching nude
erotic dancing, but rather the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public health, safety, and
welfare, which we have previously recognized are 'caused by the presence of even one such'
establishment") (internal citations omitted).
139. Id.
140. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REv. 291, 306
(2009) (emphasis added).
141. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
142. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-25-130 (2009).
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2255 (e)(1)(2008).
145. Mo. REV. STAT. § 226.531 (2006).
146. To put it differently, the recent laws targeting billboards for SOBs are not, unlike some
billboard laws, "vestige[s] of the 1960s era effort to 'beautify' the expanding interstate highway
system by limiting the proliferation of billboards." Vono v. Lewis, 594 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (D.
R.I. 2009).
147. Wheeler v. Comm'r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1987).
148. Id.
FREE WAY PORN & THE SIGNS OF SIN
termed the continued "encroachment on commercial speech" 149 of the
secondary effects doctrine.
2. Billboards for Tobacco Products
Turning to billboards advertising tobacco products, the primary
justifications for restricting them rest in the protection of minors from
exposure to a product that is illegal for them to purchase and, in turn,
protecting them from a product that will harm their health. 150 As
Representative Henry Waxman, the primary sponsor of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 151 put it, the law
will "ensure that tobacco is not advertised for children or sold to them." 152
The Congressional findings, as set forth in the legislation behind the new
measure, provide in relevant part that "[t]obacco advertising and marketing
contribute significantly to the use of nicotine-containing tobacco products
by adolescents" 153 and that "[b]ecause past efforts to restrict advertising
and marketing of tobacco products have failed adequately to curb tobacco
use by adolescents, comprehensive restrictions on the sale, promotion, and
distribution of such products are needed." 154
Similarly, when Massachusetts enacted a law prohibiting smokeless
tobacco or cigar advertising within a 1,000-foot radius of a school or
playground, it did so "in an effort to combat the use of tobacco products by
minors .... 155 Likewise, Baltimore, Maryland was "successful in
characterizing restrictions as based on the goal of preventing the promotion
of illegal products to minors." 156 Legislators may fear the impact of such
billboards on minors because, as civil rights attorney Katherine Culliton
149. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms," 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 86 (1997). Hudson goes so far to describe the
secondary effects "doctrine's pervasive use in First Amendment commercial speech cases." Id. at
88 (emphasis added).
150. See generally Patricia A. Davidson, Tales From the Tobacco Wars: Industry
Advertising Targets Teenage Girls, 13 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 25-26 (1998) (noting how both the
FDA and the city of Baltimore, Maryland, were concerned about the exposure of minors to
billboards advertising tobacco products).
15 1. See supra note 49 (discussing this legislation as it relates to billboard advertisements).
152. Duff Wilson, A Vote Nears for a Tobacco Bill That Philip Morris Can Live With, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at B3.
153. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2009), 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (2009) and 21
U.S.C. § 387f-1 (2009)).
154. Id.
155. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).
156. Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS.
1,4(1997).
20L1
236 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:215
wrote, "[d]ue to the susceptibility of youth, advertising or marketing to
young people is considered to be a highly effective business tool." 157
Attorney Robert Kline, director of the Tobacco Control Legal Clinic at
Northeastern University School of Law, adds that "research has shown that
young children regard and recognize tobacco advertising images in a
positive manner. Researchers have demonstrated a strong link between
tobacco promotion and the decision by adolescents to begin smoking." 158
In summary, restrictions targeting billboards for both sexually
oriented business and tobacco products are aimed, in large part, at shielding
the eyes of minors from content that is illegal for them to purchase-
minors cannot lawfully purchase cigarettes or sexually explicit
magazines 159-and that may, at least in the case of billboards for SOBs,
contain offensive imagery or language that supposedly is damaging to
minors.
With these interests in mind, the article now provides a brief overview
of the commercial speech doctrine, as it embodies the legal standard
typically applied to billboards promoting commercial products and
services.
III. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND SIN ADVERTISING: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW
To analyze the constitutional validity of laws targeting advertising on
billboards for SOBs and tobacco products, courts rely on the four-part test
157. Katherine Culliton, The Impact of Alcohol and Tobacco Advertising on the Latino
Community as a Civil Rights Issue, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 71, 73 (2005).
158. Robert L. Kline, Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What
Remains to be Done, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 621 (2000).
159. Various obscenity statutes prevent the sale to minors of non-obscene, yet sexually
explicit, magazines and other materials that adults can freely purchase. See Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (upholding a New York statute, which used the phrase "harmful
to minors," that restricted minors' access to sexually explicit speech that was otherwise non-
obscene for adults). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.5 (2005) (providing, in relevant part,
that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or recklessly distribute to a minor,
possess with intent to distribute to a minor, or offer or agree to distribute to a minor any material
which is harmful to minors"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-68-502 (2005) (making it unlawful to
knowingly "[d]isplay material that is harmful to minors in such a way that the material is exposed
to the view of a minor as part of the invited general public" and to "[s]ell, furnish, present,
distribute, allow to view, or otherwise disseminate to a minor with or without consideration any
material that is harmful to minors"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.76 (Supp. 2010) (making it
illegal to knowingly "[d]isplay material which is harmful to minors in such a way that minors, as
a part of the invited general public, will be exposed to view such material" and to knowingly
"[s]ell, furnish, present, distribute, allow to view, or otherwise disseminate to a minor, with or
without consideration, any material which is harmful to minors").
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created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 160 As a threshold
matter, the high court has grappled mightily with finding a suitable
definition for commercial speech. 161 It has openly acknowledged "the
difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech
in a distinct category." 162 And, although the commercial speech doctrine
already has been the subject of much scholarly criticism 163 and judicial
condemnation, '64 despite it being of relatively "recent vintage," 165 the
Central Hudson test still stands today, three decades after its adoption.
As a starting point under this test, only advertising for lawful
activities/products that are neither false nor misleading receive First
Amendment protection. 166 If the advertising is for a lawful
activity/product and is truthful, then it receives protection, but it still can be
regulated if the government demonstrates that it has a substantial interest
that is directly advanced by a regulation that is "not more extensive than is
160. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
161. See Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 67, 74 (2007) ("[T]he Supreme
Court has cryptically offered a number of different-and not always consistent-definitions of
commercial speech .... ").
162. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993).
163. See, e.g., Bruce E. H. Johnson, First Amendment Commercial Speech Protections: A
Practitioner's Guide, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 297, 303 (2007) (describing commercial speech
jurisprudence as varying "from case to case in ways that make utterly no sense"); Charles
Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 663,
664, 714 (2008) (noting that the "commercial speech doctrine is the constant subject of
reinterpretation and revision" and proposing that "with minimal doctrinal change, commercial
speech law can be simplified and made coherent"); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the
Running-But-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 383, 432
(2005) (describing commercial speech as "an unnecessary and ill-defined doctrine that turns the
First Amendment on its head").
164. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783, 794 (2007) (noting that the commercial
speech doctrine has been the subject of "occasional criticism by various justices"); Elizabeth
Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to Roost: Individualism, Collectivism and
Conflict in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 9 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 237, 245-46 (2004) ("Several
justices have advocated discarding it, arguing that the test is an artificial and ultimately
unworkable method for distinguishing protected commercial speech. Arguments for and against
the Central Hudson test have centered, ultimately, around the justices' differing conceptions of
the definitions and purposes of commercial speech.").
165. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,622 (1995).
166. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563-64 (1980) (finding that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity," and adding
that the government can ban "commercial speech related to illegal activity" and commercial
speech that is "more likely to deceive the public than to inform it").
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necessary to serve that interest." 167
This amounts to an intermediate scrutiny standard of review that
accords commercial speech "second class" status relative to the regulation
of political speech, which can only pass constitutional muster if it clears the
strict scrutiny standard of review. 168 As media attorney Daniel E. Troy
wrote, the commercial speech doctrine "gives the government considerably
more power to control the content of advertising than it has to control the
content of other communications, such as those that concern scientific,
artistic, and especially political issues." 169
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed a case directly
dealing with the regulation of billboards for a SOB, it has addressed
advertising for other sin or vice products that are legal for adults but not
minors, including tobacco 170 and alcohol. 171 Significantly, these cases
established that the government would not be accorded greater deference
under the Central Hudson test just because it was attempting to regulate the
advertising of these products. The Supreme Court, for instance, in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 172 wrote that "we find unpersuasive the
State's contention that.., the price advertising ban [for alcohol] should be
upheld because it targets commercial speech that pertains to a 'vice'
activity." 173 It thus squarely rejected the existence of "any 'vice' exception
to the protection afforded by the First Amendment." 174 The high court, in
167. Id. at 566.
168. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing "the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson"); FARBER, supra note 117, at 151
(explaining the importance of the "free flow of commercial information"); Tamara R. Piety,
Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won 't Go
Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) (observing that "the commercial speech doctrine
creates a category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment"). As
the United States Supreme Court has observed, "[w]hen a law burdens core political speech, we
apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S, 334, 347 (1995). See
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, n.3 (1992) (observing that "a content-based regulation of
political speech in a public forum is valid only if it can survive strict scrutiny").
169. Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 88
(1999).
170. See generally Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 590 (striking down a Massachusetts law
that regulated the outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco products and cigars).
171. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (striking
down a state statute restricting the retail price advertising of alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional a law prohibiting beer labels
from displaying alcohol content).
172. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
173. Id. at 513.
174. Id. at 514.
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another alcohol-related case, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 175 similarly
rejected crafting an exception to Central Hudson for advertising alcohol. 176
The two alcohol cases, in fact, arguably beefed up protection for
commercial speech. As Professors Michael Hoefges and Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez observed in a 2000 law journal article:
The decisions in Rubin and 44 Liquormart taken together
significantly tightened the third and fourth Central Hudson
factors. Rubin, in particular, stands for the proposition that
irrational and inconsistent regulations of protected commercial
speech will not likely pass constitutional muster. In addition,
the Rubin Court refused to relax the Central Hudson analysis for
regulations of "vice" advertising. Instead, the Court demanded
evidence under the third (direct advancement) factor and crafted
a direct-means analysis under the fourth (narrowly tailored)
factor, the latter of which became a strong point of agreement
for the justices in 44 Liquormart. 177
Likewise, in a different law journal article analyzing the high court's
ruling in the tobacco-related case of Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 178
Professor Hoefges observes that:
the Lorillard Tobacco Court clearly continued a trend of
providing strong First Amendment protection for non-
misleading advertising including tobacco advertising. In
addition, the Court made it clear that the First Amendment will
not allow the government to substantially disrupt the flow of
lawful commercial information to adult consumers even when a
compelling regulatory goal of protecting children from the
harms of tobacco usage exists. 179
Former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan aptly summed
up the Supreme Court's rulings in the alcohol cases of Rubin and 44
175. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
176. Id. at 482 n.2.
177. Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, "Vice" Advertising Under the Supreme
Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 372 (2000). See Emily Erickson, Disfavored Advertising:
Telemarketing, Junk Faxes and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 11 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 589,
627 (2006) (stating that "[i]n terms of vice advertising, the Court has already returned to its
Virginia Pharmacy prohibition of paternalistic regulations and the classic precedent has been
sufficiently re-adopted as the prevailing paradigm").
178. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
179. Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 311
(2003).
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Liquormart by writing that "vice advertising is arguably doing much better
now." 180 With this brief overview of the commercial speech doctrine in
mind, the article now turns to how it has been applied in the cases
addressing the constitutionality of billboards advertising SOBs and tobacco
products.
IV. JUDICIAL ANALYSES OF SOB AND TOBACCO BILLBOARD
REGULATIONS: THE SIGNS OF SIN ARE STILL STANDING
This part is divided into two sections: the first addresses legal rulings
relating to laws that target billboards for sexually oriented businesses,
while the second section addresses laws that restrict billboards advertising
tobacco products.
A. Billboards for Sexually Oriented Businesses
The 2006 opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon 181 set the standard and precedent in 2009
for two federal district courts striking down similar laws targeting
billboards for SOBs in Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six 182 and Carolina
Pride, Inc. v. MeMaster. 183
1. Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon: Missouri's Flawed Law
In Passions Video, the Eighth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test
to evaluate the constitutionality of a Missouri law that, among other things,
prohibited SOBs from off-premises advertising within one mile of state
highways. 184 Missouri's law made "no reference to the content of the off-
premises advertising signs." 185 In other words, SOBs in Missouri could
not even advertise near highways via text-only billboards that simply
provided the name of a business and an exit ramp, such as hypothetical
word-only signs like "Lion's Den Adult Superstore, Exit 37" or "Adult
180. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers'First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 569, 578, n.59 (1998).
181. Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon, 458 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2006).
182. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Kan. 2009).
183. Carolina Pride, Inc. v. McMaster (Carolina Pride 11), No. 3:08-04016-CMC, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72436 (D. S.C. Aug. 13, 2009).
184. Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 839-40. The appellate court wrote that "we apply the
four-step commercial speech analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson." Id. at
841. The law also restricted on-premises advertising, a discussion of which is beyond the scope
of this article. Id. at 839.
185. Id. at 841.
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World Store Next Exit."
The law was challenged by Passions Video, Inc., which operates one
adult store in rural Boonville, Missouri, near Interstate 70, 186 another in
Marshall Junction, 187 and Gala Entertainment of KC, Inc., 188 which owns
the Satin Dolls strip club near Interstate 70 in Kansas City, Missouri. 189
Passions Video, as one newspaper article reported, "maintains a variety of
billboards along the state's highways, some proclaiming 'Passions-Where
lovers shop,' others advertising the business as an 'Adult Superstore' that
sells adult toys, videos and the like." 190 However, they were not the only
companies with billboards for SOBs near Interstate 70 in the Show Me
State. The Kansas City Star reported in 2004 that the law targeted "the
dozens of adult-oriented billboards that have sprouted in recent years along
the state's highways, particularly along Interstate 70 between Kansas City
and Columbia. One lawmaker counted 45 sex-themed billboards lining that
stretch of highway." 191
The initial prongs of Central Hudson were dispatched with quite
easily in Passions Video. The appellate court, for instance, observed that
"[t]here is no dispute here that the speech in question is commercial speech
that contains no misleading statements or concerns unlawful activity, and is
therefore constitutionally protected." 192 Again, the court quickly
concluded that Missouri had a substantial interest in preventing the
supposed secondary effects of SOBs and limiting harm to minors. 193
186. See Passions Video, Inc. on CitySquares, http://mo.citysquares.com/boonville/retail-
shopping/toy-game-stores/passions-video-inc (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing the address
and phone number for Passions Video, Inc.), and Profile of Passions Video Incorporated on
Kudzu, http://missouri.kudzu.com/merchant/9594859.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (providing
the address and phone number for Passions Video, Inc.).
187. See Adult Businesses Challenge Missouri Ban on Sexy Billboards, FIRST AMEND.
CENTER, Aug. 30, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=13950 (reporting
that "Passions Video, based in Boonville, owns one store there and another in Marshall
Junction"); AP Wire Service, Suit Challenges Ban on Sex-Oriented Billboards, TULSA WORLD,
Aug. 29, 2004, at A12 (reporting that "Passions Video, based in the central Missouri town of
Boonville, owns one adult book store there and another in Marshall Junction, about 40 miles east
of Kansas City").
188. Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 839.
189. Kansas City Strip Club Fighting Ban on Sexually Oriented Billboards, BELLEVILLE
NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Aug. 30, 2004, at B4. See Dan Margolies, Sex-Ad Billboards Will Stay, KAN.
CITY STAR, Aug. 22, 2006, at Al (stating that the law took "aim at the dozens of adult-oriented
billboards that have sprouted along Missouri's highways, particularly Interstate 70 in recent
years").
190. Margolies, supra note 189.
191. Dan Margolies, Billboard Law Challenged, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 28, 2004, at C1.
192. Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 842.
193. Id.
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Turning to the final two prongs of Central Hudson, the Eighth Circuit
wrote that "[a]lthough there may be some evidence that the statute directly
and materially advances the state's asserted interest, the statute fails under
the final Central Hudson step because it is not narrowly tailored to meet its
asserted goals." 194 In analyzing the final prong, the appellate court
emphasized that "[t]he availability of obvious and numerous less-
burdensome alternatives to the restriction factors into the consideration of
whether the 'fit' is reasonable." 195 It blasted Missouri's blanket ban on all
SOB billboards, writing that the law "threatens criminal prosecution for the
mere inclusion of the name or address of an affected business on billboards
within one mile of a state highway." 196 Given the wide sweep of the
statute, the appellate court concluded that the statute "is directed at speech
beyond that which would lead to the stated secondary effects, and is not
narrowly tailored to achieve Missouri's stated goal." 197 In support of its
conclusion, the Eighth Circuit cited 198 the 1998 opinion by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Georgia v. Cafe Erotica, Inc. 199
In Cafi Erotica, the high court of Georgia considered a state statute
that prohibited "any off-premises outdoor advertising of commercial
establishments where nudity is exhibited."2 oo It observed that the Georgia
law "is not directed solely at provocative images, but it prohibits even a
worded sign advertising the location of a business."201 The court thus held
that "[b]ecause the absolute proscription against any form of off-site
advertising impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the State's
legitimate interest, [the statute] is an unconstitutional infringement on free
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Georgia Bill of
Rights." 
20 2
2. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six: Deep-Sixing Kansas' Law
The 2009 battle fought over billboards was not the first legal skirmish
that the Lion's Den store in Abilene, Kansas has fought in its brief
existence. Shortly after it opened its doors in September 2004, a self-
righteously titled group called Citizens for Strengthening Community
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 843.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Passions Video, 458 F.3d at 843.
199. Georgia v. Caf6 Erotica, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. 1998).
200. Id. at 733 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 735.
202. Id.
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Virtues conducted what the Associated Press described as a 100-day vigil
in front of it, with protestors holding "signs warning truckers they would
notify their bosses if they went inside."2 3 The protestors even engaged in
their own measure of billboard counterspeech 204 when they took out a
billboard of their own conveying the message, "Jesus Heals and Restores.
Pornography Destroys."205 In 2005, the Abilene Lion's Den successfully
defended against ten misdemeanor charges that accused the store of
"illegally promoting obscenity by selling sexual devices." 20 6 Then came
the billboard battle.
In June 2009, U.S. District Judge Julie A. Robinson issued a
preliminary injunction in Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 20 7 on First
Amendment grounds, that stopped Kansas from enforcing a statute
prohibiting off-premises outdoor advertising located within one mile of
highways, for sexually-oriented businesses. 208 The law was challenged by
the owner of a Kansas Lion's Den store located in Abilene, Kansas, that:
displays three (3) billboards along 1-70 in Dickinson, Geary, and
Russell counties. None of the billboards contain images;
however, the company logo appears on two of the billboards.
They all display yellow block letters on a black background
stating that an adult "superstore" named Lion's Den is located at
Exit 272.209
Judge Robinson applied the rule from Central Hudson to analyze the
constitutionality of the Kansas signage statute.21 0 On the first prong, the
203. Group Finishes Crusade Against Adult Business, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD
(Lawrence, Kan.), Feb. 4, 2004, at 8B.
204. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look
at the Old Remedy for "Bad" Speech, 2000 BYU L. REv. 553 (2000) (providing an overview of
the counterspeech doctrine and relatively recent examples of its use).
205. John Hanna, Idea of Sin Tax on Pornography Intrigues Some State Legislators,
LJWORLD.COM, July 18, 2005,
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/jul/I8/idea-sin-tax-pornography-intrigues-some-state-legi
/?kansasjlegislature.
206. David Clouston, Judge Dismisses Obscenity Charges Against Abilene, Kan., Adult
Bookstore, SALINA J. (Salina KS.), Sept. 8, 2005, at IA.
207. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Kan. 2009).
208. Id. at 1187. The law allowed only for on-premises advertising, and even that was
confined to:
one identification sign and one sign solely giving notice that the premises are off
limits to minors. The identification sign shall be no more than 40 square feet in
size and shall include no more than the following information: Name, street
address, telephone number and operating hours of the business.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2255(b) (2008).
209. Abilene Retail, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
210. Id. at 1190 (writing that "[t]he Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
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court concluded that the Lion's Den billboards fell within the scope of First
Amendment protection as they did not advertise illegal goods or
services. 2 1  Judge Robinson observed that "Lion's Den has submitted
evidence that it markets the products they sell to those interested in 'a
healthy sex life' and not to those with a 'prurient interest in sex.'
Furthermore, there are no currently pending criminal charges against
plaintiff based on these allegations. 212  The court thus rejected the
argument by Kansas Attorney General Stephen Six "that the advertising
necessarily proposes an illegal transaction." 
213
Regarding the second prong of Central Hudson, Judge Robinson
engaged in what can only be characterized, in the opinion of the author, as
a cursory analysis. 214 After noting that Kansas had asserted goals of
mitigating the secondary effects of SOBs and limiting harm to minors, as
well as improving traffic safety, Judge Robinson simply stated "[t]he Court
assumes for purposes of its analysis that the State can establish that these
are substantial interests." 215
Turning to the third prong of Central Hudson, the court reasoned that
"because the statute constitutes an outright ban on off-premises advertising,
the State must show that the signage statute will significantly further its
stated interests. The regulation cannot be sustained by speculation or
conjecture., 216  Here the court engaged in a much more detailed
examination of the evidence, initially noting that Kansas "proffered some
evidence in the form of legislative history that the signage statute will
advance the State's interests. 2 17  Judge Robinson, to her credit, was
extremely skeptical of the secondary effects introduced by Kansas, writing
that:
the Attorney General has provided this Court with absolutely no
anecdotal evidence of negative secondary effects associated with
sexually-oriented businesses aside from the conclusory
statements by the sponsor of the bill, a lobbyist, and a resident of
Dickinson County, with no supporting documentation. At this
v. Public Service Commission set forth a four-part test that applies to commercial speech
regulations. The Court applies this test to the Kansas signage statute, as it prohibits off-premises
and on-premises advertising for sexually-oriented businesses").
211. Id. at 1192-93.
212. Id. at 1192.
213. Id. at 1193.
214. The analysis of the second prong consisted of one paragraph that was comprised of
four sentences. Id.
215. Abilene Retail, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 1194.
217. Id.
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stage of the proceedings, the Court is unable to conclude, based
on the limited record, that the State could establish that its
outright ban on off-premises advertising and limitation of on-
premises signage will significantly further its interests in
reducing the negative secondary effects caused by sexually-
oriented businesses. 218
Addressing the state's assertion that the law would limit harm to
minors, Judge Robinson seemed equally skeptical. She reasoned that
"[a]ssuming signs and outdoor advertising for sexually-oriented businesses
increase the chances that minors will attempt to patronize those businesses,
there is no evidence of a 'direct and material link' to an all-out ban on
signs, including those that merely include the name and location of the
business. ' 219  Thus, unlike Missouri's statute discussed above, 220 the
Kansas law could not even pass constitutional muster on the third prong of
Central Hudson.
To add insult to injury, Judge Robinson also found that the Kansas
law failed the fourth prong of Central Hudson for not being narrowly
tailored, as "there is no evidence that advertising away from a state
highway would serve any function.", 22' She wrote that, "[a]ssuming
without deciding that the State could show that the ban on advertising
significantly advances its various interests, the Court finds it unlikely that
an outright ban on off-premises advertising will be found to be narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's objectives set forth in the statute. 222
Commenting on the remarkable breadth of the statute, the judge added that
"[t]he statute broadly sweeps any speech that is 'for' a sexually-oriented
businesses, whether or not that speech is obscene or relates to the sale of
constitutionally protected products such as books and magazines., 223
The court in Abilene Retail thus granted a preliminary injunction
stopping enforcement of the law. 224 In August 2009, less than two full
months after Judge Robinson's opinion, Kansas Attorney General Stephen
Six announced that he would not appeal the decision, stating that "[g]iven
the state's budget challenges, it would be fiscally irresponsible to continue
litigation that has very little chance of success." 225 Six admitted in his
218. Id. at 1195.
219. Id. at 1196 (emphasis added).
220. Supra notes 185-197 and accompanying text.
221. Abilene Retail, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1197.
224. Id. at 1199.
225. Press Release, Kansas Attorney General Steve Six, Lion's Den Litigation Concluded
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press release that "[t]he Kansas statute was substantively identical to the
Missouri statute. Kansas copied its statute from Missouri after the
Missouri federal district court held the statute to be constitutional." 26 One
is left to wonder, then, why Kansas chose to fight the initial battle at the
district court level on the taxpayers' dime if it knew the law was very likely
unconstitutional. The day after the parties announced their settlement,
Judge Robinson approved it. 227
3. Carolina Pride, Inc. v. McMaster: South Carolina's Law Tossed
In August 2009 in Carolina Pride, Inc. v. McMaster, United States
District Court Judge Cameron McGowan Currie held that South Carolina's
statute targeting billboards located within one mile of public highways that
advertise SOBs "violate[d] the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment." 228 He then issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the
statute's enforcement. 229  The decision affirmed Currie's earlier ruling
from February 2009 and converted a preliminary injunction against the law
that he had granted at that time. 230
In issuing that February ruling, Judge Currie cited as precedent both
the Passions Video, Inc. v. Nixon and Georgia v. Cafi Erotica, Inc.,
opinions discussed earlier in this article that involved similar laws.231
Noting that "both cases found the statutes unconstitutional, 2 32 Judge
Currie not surprisingly applied the Central Hudson test to evaluate South
Carolina's law, 233 and determined there were several problems with it. 234
On the third prong of Central Hudson, Judge Currie gave a detailed
analysis criticizing South Carolina's stated goal of limiting harms to minors
from viewing and reading billboards that advertise SOBs. 235 Among other
(Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.ksag.org/page/lions-den-litigation-concluded.
226. Id.
227. See So Much For Federalism! Federal Judge Says No to Kansas Pron Sign
Limitations, THE KANSAS FEDERALIST, Aug. 17, 2009,
http://www.kansasfederalist.com/081709issue.html (reporting that Judge Robinson "approved an
agreement ending a lawsuit over Kansas' attempt to restrict some adult stores' signs").
228. Carolina Pride II, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72436 at *11.
229. Id. at *12.
230. Carolina Pride I, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300 at *42-43.
23 1. Id. at * 18; See supra notes 181-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Passions
Video and Cafi Erotica cases).
232. Carolina Pride I, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300 at *18.
233. Id. at *18, 23-41.
234. Id. at *22.
235. Id. at *32-34.
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things, the judge wrote that South Carolina's:
concern that parents might need to explain to a child what is
meant by some euphemism for "sexually-oriented business"
(e.g., "adult bookstore" or "gentlemen's club"), presents only an
attenuated link to the claimed protective purpose underlying the
advertising ban. In the modem age, parents are often required to
limit their children's access to inappropriate materials including
radio and television programs, books, videos and even certain
articles (or advertisements) in newspapers in which a child
might see announcements. 236
The last sentence of this statement above demonstrates the vast under-
inclusiveness problem with the justification of shielding minors from
237access to a particular type of content in one medium but not in others.
As Judge Richard Posner wrote for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in American Amusement Machine Association v.
Kendrick238 in striking down an Indianapolis ordinance targeting violent
imagery in video games located at arcades, "[v]iolent video games played
in public places are a tiny fraction of the media violence to which modem
American children are exposed." 239 Likewise, a federal judge in the state
of Washington pointed out, in holding unconstitutional a state law targeting
violent video games, that the statute was "too narrow in that it will have no
effect on the many other channels through which violent representations
are presented to children." 
2 40
Focusing on the fourth and final prong of Central Hudson, Judge Currie
found:
a high probability that Plaintiff will succeed in establishing that
the challenged statute fails the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test, at least as applied to Plaintiffs current signs. The
restrictions at issue amount to a virtual ban on use of an entire
236. Id. at *33 (emphasis added).
237. See generally Clay Calvert, The Two-Step Evidentiary and Causation Quandary for
Medium-Specific Laws Targeting Sexual and Violent Content: First Proving Harm and Injury to
Silence Speech, then Proving Redress and Rehabilitation Through Censorship, 60 FED. COMM.
L.J. 157, 170 (2008) (addressing the "underinclusiveness problem that plagues laws that single
out one medium (television, for example) for conveying content such as violent imagery but that
leave unregulated and unlegislated other varieties of media (movies, video games, and the
Internet) to transmit the same content").
238. Am. Amusement Mach. Assoc. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 994 (2001).
239. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
240. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (emphasis added).
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medium, outdoor signage. It is difficult to envision that such a
near-total statewide ban would be found to be sufficiently
narrowly drawn.24'
Attorney J. Michael Murray, a member of the Lion's Dens legal team
that challenged the law, trumpeted the outcome as "an important victory for
freedom of expression ', 242  and added that "[w]e prevailed upon
demonstrating to the court's satisfaction that the statute was a clear
abridgement of the First Amendment right of freedom of speech in this
case commercial speech. So we were very, very pleased." 
243
In summary, the three judicial strikes against laws targeting billboards
advertising SOBs in the Passions Video, Abilene Retail # 30 and Carolina
Pride decisions built a solid foundation of precedent against their future.
But rather than adopt a three-strikes-and-you're-out mentality, some
lawmakers seem willing to push ahead with more regulation in this area.244
That issue is addressed later in Part V of this article. 245
B. Billboards for Tobacco Products
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 246 the United States Supreme
Court in 2001 declared unconstitutional a provision of a Massachusetts law
that prohibited outdoor advertising for cigars and smokeless tobacco
products in any location "within a 1,000 foot radius of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or
secondary school."247 In making its ruling, the high court focused only on
the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. 248
On the third prong, the Court began by noting that this part "concerns
the relationship between the harm that underlies the State's interest and the
241. Carolina Pride 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300 at *40.
242. Horlbeck, supra note 15.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009) (providing, in relevant part, that
"any billboard within this state that advertises a sexually oriented business shall display only
words or numbers and may display the business's trademark if the trademark has been registered
under the Lanham Act"); see infra notes 297-323 and accompanying text (addressing legislation
in Michigan that would regulate billboards for sexually oriented business in that state).
245. See infra notes 297-323 and accompanying text (addressing legislation in Michigan
that would regulate billboards for sexually oriented businesses in that state).
246. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
247. Id. at 535.
248. See id. at 555 (writing that "only the last two steps of Central Hudson's four-part
analysis are at issue here," as there was no challenge by the tobacco-industry plaintiffs to "the
importance of the State's interest in preventing the use of tobacco products by minors").
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means identified by the State to advance that interest." 249 It emphasized
that while mere speculation and conjecture that a law will directly and
materially advance a government interest will not suffice, references to
both empirical and anecdotal data from other locales may suffice. 250 This
distinction was important because Massachusetts, by and large, did not rely
on its own evidence regarding the link between advertising and tobacco-
product usage, but instead "on evidence gathered by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in its attempt to regulate the advertising of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco." 25 1 The FDA had "considered several studies of
tobacco advertising and trends in the use of various tobacco products" 
252
when it drafted rules in the 1990s, which were very similar to those
adopted by Massachusetts. But these never took effect because of the 2000
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that the FDA "lack[ed] statutory
authority to regulate tobacco products."253
Applying this rule and the FDA-generated evidence to the facts of the
case, the Supreme Court found that:
the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless
tobacco and cigars. In addition, we disagree with petitioners'
claim that there is no evidence that preventing targeted
campaigns and limiting youth exposure to advertising will
decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. 254
With the outdoor-advertising measuring surviving scrutiny on the
third prong of Central Hudson, the high court turned its attention to the
final question of narrow tailoring: whether there was a reasonable fit
between Massachusetts' goal of preventing the use of tobacco products by
minors and the means chosen to accomplish that goal.255 In brief, this step
"requires a reasonable fit between the means and ends of the regulatory
scheme." 256
The court held that Massachusetts failed to meet its burden here. 257 A
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 557.
252. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 558.
253. Id. at 558 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
254. Id. at 561.
255. Id. at 556.
256. Id. at 561.
257. Id. (holding that "[w]hatever the strength of the Attorney General's evidence to justify
the outdoor advertising regulations, however, we conclude that the regulations do not satisfy the
fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis").
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major problem is the 1,000-foot buffer zone around schools and
playgrounds applied to all of Massachusetts, from rural areas to major
metropolitan ones.258 The high court noted that the Massachusetts
"Attorney General did not seem to consider the impact of the 1,000-foot
restriction on commercial speech in major metropolitan areas. ' ' 259  The
Attomey General "apparently selected the 1,000-foot distance based on the
FDA's decision to impose an identical 1,000-foot restriction when it
attempted to regulate cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising."
2 60
Noting that this would have a much greater impact on metropolitan areas
where schools and playgrounds are more tightly clustered such that there
could be very, very few tobacco-product billboards, 2 61 the high court held
that "[t]he uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation
demonstrates a lack of tailoring." 
262
In contrast to Massachusetts' unconstitutional billboard law, 263 a law
adopted by Baltimore, Maryland, that targeted outdoor ads for both alcohol
and tobacco products passed constitutional muster in a pair of decisions by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.264 The Fourth Circuit
found the fit was reasonable, noting that:
Baltimore does not ban outdoor advertising of alcoholic
beverages outright but merely restricts the time, place, and
manner of such advertisements. And Baltimore's ordinance
does not foreclose the plethora of newspaper, magazine, radio,
television, direct mail, Internet, and other media available to
Anheuser-Busch and its competitors.265
Also critical here was the fact that Baltimore's law actually exempted
"commercial and industrial zones from its effort." 266 These areas are ones
where minors are less likely to be present and thus less likely to be exposed
258. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 562.
259. Id. at 562-63.
260. Id.
261. The Court wrote that "[e]ven in Massachusetts, the effect of the Attorney General's
speech regulations will vary based on whether a locale is rural, suburban, or urban." Id. at 563.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 562-63.
264. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding,
against a constitutional challenge, a Baltimore "ordinance prohibiting the placement of stationary,
outdoor advertising that advertises alcoholic beverages in certain areas" of the city); Penn Adver.
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding restrictions on
outdoor advertising for cigarettes in Baltimore).
265. Anheuser-Busch, 101 F.3d at 329 (4th Cir. 1996).
266. Id. at 328.
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to tobacco and alcohol-related billboards. 267
One might take away from this at least two things: (1) statewide
measures that simply slap uniform standards on all geographic areas (rural,
suburban and urban), as was the case with the Massachusetts law and its
1,000-foot buffer,268 are not likely to survive Central Hudson because they
indicate little effort to narrowly tailor the measure; 269 and (2) local
measures that carve out exemptions for particular areas of town where
minors are less likely to congregate are indicative of efforts to narrowly
tailor laws.
Professor Michael Hoefges, in an article closely analyzing the
Supreme Court's decision in Lorillard, writes that:
the Lorillard Tobacco Court continued its trend of requiring the
government to seek out more direct means of accomplishing
regulatory goals than restricting protected commercial speech.
In other words, a regulation of protected commercial speech is
unlikely to be considered narrowly tailored if there are direct
regulatory means available that government has not tried or has
tried and found ineffective. 270
Such direct means might take the form of imposing increased taxes on
cigarettes or simply stricter age verification at the point of sale.271
Although a complete discussion of a more direct means is beyond the scope
of this article and is fodder for an article of its own, it should be noted that
several states recently have considered imposing a so-called porn tax on
272adult entertainment content, such as Washington state's failed effort in
267. Id.
268. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 535.
269. Cf Hoefges, supra note 179, at 307 (contending that after the Supreme Court's
decision in Lorillard, "the Court seems unwilling to tolerate such broad suppression of protected
commercial speech when narrower, more precise regulations have not been considered. But it
remains to be seen how the Court might handle more exacting regulations under the fourth
Central Hudson factor.").
270. Id. at 308.
271. As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. noted when he was on the bench of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit and wrote an opinion declaring unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law
that prohibited bars and restaurants from advertising the prices of liquor specials in college
newspapers, "the Commonwealth can seek to combat underage and abusive drinking by other
means that are far more direct and that do not affect the First Amendment. The most direct way
to combat underage and abusive drinking by college students is the enforcement of the alcoholic
beverage control laws on college campuses." Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 108 (3d Cir.
2004). The same logic would apply to point-of-purchase venues for cigarettes.
272. See Tom Barnes, Sen. Orie Looking Into Tax on Sex Industry, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Jan. 5, 2008, at A-1 (describing plans by a Pennsylvania state senator to "ask senators to call for a
study by a legislative research group on whether a tax should be imposed on sexually explicit,
adult-oriented businesses," and noting that "[t]he sex tax, or porn tax as others are calling it, could
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early 2009 "to add an 18.5 percent sales tax to adult entertainment
materials." 273
A federal district court in Kentucky will soon have the opportunity to
consider the federal government's efforts to regulate billboard advertising
for tobacco products in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States. 274
At issue is a part of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act of 2009 that gives Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, the power to regulate billboards near schools and
playgrounds. 275 The FDA is still seeking public comment on such
regulation, 276 so the final terms of the billboard regulations are not yet
known.
V. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION
In analyzing the recent laws and judicial opinions related to billboards
advertising so-called vice products like adult DVDs and cigarettes, this
article has coined the term secondary secondary-effects,277 and has
illustrated how the efforts of municipalities to use this rationale to regulate
billboards that advertise SOBs is fundamentally flawed. 278
Significantly, not everyone in rural or heartland America wants to
outlaw freeway-adjacent billboards for SOBs. For instance, the editors of
the Garden City Telegram in rural Kansas 279 got it right in a September
be a 10 percent levy on the admission price to an adult-oriented business, or a tax on the sale of
food and drink at such businesses"); Editorial, Forget the Porn Tax, ANNISTON STAR (Ala.), Apr.
9, 2008, at 8A (describing the idea of a "porn tax" as being "touted by Paul Hubbert, executive
secretary of the Alabama Education Association," and questioning how, if implemented, Alabama
would "go about deciding what is pornographic, meaning material without redeeming value, and
what is merely offensive content?"); Richard Roesler, Porn Tax Proposed to Buttress Budget,
SPOKESMAN REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Feb. 11, 2009, at A6 (reporting that the state of Washington
"has long had sin taxes" on items such as tobacco, liquor and beer, but is now considering a "porn
tax" that "would add an extra 18.5 percent sales tax to 'adult entertainment materials and
services').
273. Madelyn Fairbanks, Porn Tax Bill Rejected Without a Hearing, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 19, 2009, at A 13.
274. See Commonwealth Brands Complaint, supra note 57.
275. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4402
and 21 U.S.C. § 387A-1 (2009)).
276. FDA Seeking Public Comment on Tobacco Regulation,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/ucml 73455.ht
m (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
277. Supra notes 136-58 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 135-59 and accompanying text (discussing what this article calls the
"secondary secondary-effects" doctrine).
279. Garden City is located in Finney County, Kansas, which:
measures 48 miles east to west across the top, 24 miles across the bottom, is 36
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2009 editorial when they opined:
Forget the argument of whether pornography is harmful. People
have a constitutional right to produce and view it. You don't
approve? That's none of your business. Like the Salina police
of decades ago, most of us have figured out that we have better
things to do than to try to stop others who want to look at dirty
pictures. 280
Likewise, the editors of the Hays Daily News in Hays, Kansas, 28'
took an equally forceful First Amendment position, reasoning that:
It really doesn't matter if one condones or condemns tobacco
products, liquor, trans-fat-laden food products, low-mileage
vehicles, coal-fired power plants, abortion providers or even
adult night clubs and sex shops. What matters in these United
States is whether the businesses are legal or not-at least as far
as any advertising or marketing the companies choose to
282
pursue.
The Hays Daily News further opined against Kansas Attorney General
Steve Six's efforts to thwart the Lion's Dens' billboards at issue in Abilene
Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six 283:
Perhaps the attorney general and his team of lawyers don't
appreciate the extremely large, attention-grabbing billboards
every traveler on Interstate 70 can't help but notice. Who cares?
From a legal perspective, they should be treated no differently
than the multitude of billboards promoting McDonald's, the
saving powers of Jesus, Rolling Hills Wildlife Adventure, the
Eisenhower Presidential Museum, shopping in Wichita or any
miles north to south at the widest point, and 18 miles in the panhandle. Finney
County is located in southwest Kansas approximately 200 miles west of Wichita
and 300 miles southeast of Denver, Colorado. US Highways 83 and 50/400 and
Kansas Highways 156 and 23 serve the County.
About Finney County, Kansas, http://www.finneycounty.org/index.aspx?NID=62 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
280. Dena Sattler, Editorial, Adult Content, GARDEN CITY TELEGRAM (Kan.), Sept. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.gctelegram.com/ (search Archives click Editorial/Opinion "Adult
Content").
281. Hays "is the largest city in Northwest Kansas at the crossroads of Interstate 70 and US
Highway 183. This city, which has approximately 20,000 residents, was incorporated in 1885.
Hays is a growing city with excellent opportunities." City of Hays, KS, http://www.haysusa.com
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
282. Editorial, Sex Shop Billboards, HAYS DAILY NEWS, May 21, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 9700256.
283. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 641 F. Supp. 2d. 1185 (D. Kan. 2009).
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other establishment. 284
While a recent law journal article contends that "[tihe legal history of
billboards is notable for the judicial system's remarkable willingness and
ability to accommodate the public's dislike of these signs," 285 courts are
remarkably unwilling to do so when the justifications for their censorship
are not concerns about aesthetics, traffic, or safety, but pivot on the vice-
like nature of the products advertised. 286
Perhaps the courts are reluctant because they recognize, deep down
and when all of the legalese is parsed out, that the only real harm stemming
from billboards for SOBs is the red-faced embarrassment of parents that is
triggered by their querying kids. 287 Even Missouri lawmaker Matt Bartle,
the sponsor of the disputed billboard legislation in Passions Video, 
288
admitted as much when he stated, "[w]e shouldn't have a situation where
we have to explain to our children what XXX means or what an adult toy
is." 289
Bartle apparently wants children to live inside a bubble, shielded from
the real world. 290 But as Judge Richard Posner wisely wrote in striking
down a law restricting minors' access to violent video games, "the right of
parents to enlist the aid of the state to shield their children from ideas of
which the parents disapprove cannot be plenary either. People are unlikely
to become well-finctioning, independent-minded adults and responsible
citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble." 291 Likewise, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that "the government
cannot silence protected speech by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental
authority." 292 Moreover, it observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
held that "the government's role in helping parents to be the guardians of
their children's well-being is an unbridled license to governments to
regulate what minors read and view."293
However, this line of logic has not prevented lawmakers from
284. Editorial, supra note 282.
285. David Burnett, Note, Judging the Aesthetics of Billboards, 23 J. L. & POLITICS 171,
228 (2007).
286. See, e.g., Abilene Retail, 641 F. Supp. 2d. 1185.
287. See generally Margolies, supra note 191.
288. See supra notes 184-197 and accompanying text (discussing the Passions Video case).
289. Margolies, supra note 191.
290. Id.
291. Am. Amusement Mach. Assoc. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
292. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.
2003).
293. Id. at 959-60.
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continuing to craft bills in which the government takes on such a role. In
late 2009, a bill was pending in the Michigan legislature 294 that represents
a Springsteenian "one step up and two steps back ' 295 approach to
regulating billboards that advertise SOBs. In particular, Senate Bill 229
represents one step forward (in contrast to laws like those struck down in
South Carolina) because it does not ban all billboards for SOBs in
Michigan; rather, it allows them to have words, numbers, and the display of
a corporate trademark, 296 unless "the words on a billboard shall not
describe or relate to a specified sexual activity or specified anatomical
area." 297 If enacted, this bill would permit the type of text-only billboards
used by the Lion's Den adult stores in Bowman, South Carolina and
Abilene, Kansas.298  Furthermore, it would withstand a vagueness
challenge, 299 as it provides precise definitions for the phrases "specified
sexual activity" 300 and "specified anatomical area." 301
So, what are the two steps back? First, this bill clearly suffers from
an overbreadth 30 2 problem with respect to permissible content. In
294. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
295. See BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, One Step Up, on TUNNEL OF LOVE (Columbia 1987)
(singing "I'm the same old story same old act, one step up and two steps back" and "I'm caught
movin' one step up and two steps back").
296. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009) (providing, in relevant part, that "any
billboard within this state that advertises a sexually oriented business shall display only words or
numbers and may display the business's trademark if the trademark has been registered under the
Lanham Act").
297. Id.
298. See Carolina Pride 1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16300, *4 (describing the images
featured on the billboard at issue).
299. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (observing that "[i]t is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined" such that they fail to "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited").
300. The bill defines this as "the fondling or other erotic touching of covered or uncovered
human genitals, pubic region, buttocks, or female breast." S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2009).
301. The bill defines this as "less than completely and opaquely covered human genitals,
pubic region, buttocks, or female breasts below a point immediately above the top of the areola."
Id.
302. See J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. Dragani, 538 F.3d 379, 383 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that "[t]he
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the government from proscribing a 'substantial' amount of
constitutionally protected speech judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," and
adding that the "[o]verbreadth doctrine exists to allay the concern that the threat of enforcement
of an overbroad law may deter or chill constitutionally protected speech-especially when the law
provides criminal sanctions"). See generally John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First
Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53 (2004) (providing an excellent overview of the overbreadth
doctrine, including its use in both First Amendment situations and other contexts); Richard H.
Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991) (providing a critical
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particular, it does not allow any images-not a basic head-shot photo of a
dancer's face, not a photo of the outside of a store, and not a photo of an
empty dancer's stage or a simple brass pole-other than a registered
trademark. 303 There simply is no good reason why images such as the
three above should not be allowed: not one depicts any of the specified
sexual activities or anatomical areas that cannot be described by words on
the billboard. 3o4 In a nutshell, there are many benign images that could
appear on a billboard that are representative or indicative of an SOB but
that do not show sexual activity or imagery. 305 To put it bluntly, if a
billboard for a tanning salon can portray a woman in a bikini, or if a
billboard for Hooters can portray a woman wearing a white tank top and
orange shorts, then surely an SOB should be able to have some images
other than registered trademarks. 306
The bottom line is that the Michigan bill, were it to become law and
be challenged in court, would likely fail the Central Hudson commercial
speech doctrine30 7 because there is no reasonable fit between the provision
that bans all non-trademark images and the bill's apparent goal of shielding
minors from sexual imagery. In an August 2009 press release promoting
the Michigan bill, state Senator Tupac A. Hunter stated:
Virtually no one likes to see billboards promoting topless bars
and other sexually-oriented businesses, especially when you
have family members and young children in the car .... These
are not the kind of images we want to see on our way to work,
school, or to the store, and they are certainly images that I do not
want my young son, or any Michigan children, to see.308
Clearly, the bill is primarily intended to address billboard images to
which a minor might be exposed.30 9 Yet, Hunter's bill won't even allow
an image of an American flag or the Bill of Rights on a billboard
examination of the overbreadth doctrine and suggesting ways to improve it).
303. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
304. See id. (defining the specified sexual activities and anatomical areas that cannot be
described by words on the billboards, under the Michigan bill).
305. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (defining the specified sexual activities
and anatomical areas that cannot be described by words on the billboards, under the Michigan
bill).
306. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (defining the specified sexual activities
and anatomical areas that cannot be described by words on the billboards, under the Michigan
bill).
307. See supra Part II (describing the commercial speech doctrine).
308. Press Release, State Senator Tupac A. Hunter, Senate Approves Bill to Regulate
Obscene Billboards (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.senate.michigan.gov/hunter/pr.php?id=1404
(emphasis added).
309. See id.
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advertising an SOB.310 Under Hunter's legislation, the owner of an SOB
would be denied the opportunity to make the political statement of placing
the text of the free-speech portion of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution 311 on a billboard to subtly suggest that his or her movies and
magazines are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. 312
Michigan State Senator Jud Gilbert, the Chair of the Senate
Committee on Transportation, made it clear in the same press release that
he was concerned about what he called "the display of inappropriate or
offensive content on billboards in our state. 3 13  This telling statement
reveals that the true intent of the legislation has nothing to do with any
secondary effects caused by SOBs advertised on billboards; rather, it
seemingly has everything to do with shielding minors from specific
content-namely, content which is "inappropriate or offensive." 3 14  But,
perhaps because terms like "inappropriate" and "offensive" are inherently
vague, 315 the Michigan legislature opted not to use them and instead chose
to draft an overly broad law forbidding all images-even benign and
innocuous ones, as well as political ones-from billboards for SOBs. 316
The second "step back" with the Michigan billboard legislation is that
it applies to "billboards within this state," 317 regardless of where they are
located and, more specifically, regardless of whether they are likely to be
seen by children. It would sweep up billboards located near industrial
parks, as well as ones situated far away from schools, playgrounds, and
parks where children are more likely to be present. In brief, the legislation
casts its massive purse seine net 318 far too wide, encircling all of Michigan
310. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
311. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than eight decades
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
312. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich 2009).
313. Press Release, supra note 308.
314. Id.
315. In Cohen v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the conviction of Paul
Robert Cohen for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a public courthouse
"quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used to convey his
message to the public." 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971). The high court noted the definitional difficulties
with trying to define what words are offensive, famously reasoning that it is "often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials
cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style so largely to the individual." Id. at 25.
316. See S. 266, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
317. Id.
318. See Bruce Lieberman & David Hasemyer, Scientists Say Studies of Dolphin Stress
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and, in turn, ensnaring any and all billboards for SOBs regardless of their
locations. As with the problem of banning all images (other than
trademarks) on billboards for SOBs, 319 there simply is not a reasonable fit,
as is required under Central Hudson, 320 between the terms of the statute
and its goal of shielding minors from sexual imagery.
It is instructive to note here that when Baltimore, Maryland, adopted
an ordinance limiting billboards advertising alcoholic beverages and
tobacco products, it only banned "such advertisements in particular areas
where children are expected to walk to school or play in their
neighborhood." 321 In upholding this ordinance, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit observed that Baltimore was essentially attempting
"to zone outdoor alcoholic beverage advertising into appropriate areas," 
322
rather than to regulate them in every comer of the city. Thus, the Michigan
legislature should revise its legislation in accordance with the approach
taken by Baltimore if it wishes to enhance the odds of the bill surviving
constitutional scrutiny on First Amendment grounds.
Of course, the wise solution here would be for Michigan either to
drop its legislation altogether-thereby saving taxpayer dollars that would
be spent in the likely litigation brought by adult businesses to challenge it
in court--or to repackage the legislation in such a way that:
(1) forbids content on billboards that already is prohibited from
display to minors under Michigan's harmful-to-minors statute; 323 and (2)
Blocked, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 10, 2003, at A6 (explaining that "[a] purse seine is a
large net that can be closed like a draw-string purse once it has been set. It is commonly used by
tuna fisherman," and describing the controversy such nets create because they sweep up dolphins
as by-catch along with the intended catch of tuna).
319. Supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
320. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Six, 641 F. Supp. 2d. 1185, 1191 (D. Kan. 2009); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566-71 (1980).
321. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
322. Id. at 329.
323. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.674 (LexisNexis 2005). Michigan defines content that is
harmful to minors as:
sexually explicit matter which meets all of the following criteria:
(i) Considered as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest of minors as
determined by contemporary local community standards.
(ii) It is patently offensive to contemporary local community standards of adults as
to what is suitable for minors.
(iii) Considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, educational,
and scientific value for minors.
Id. § 722.674(a). The same statute, in turn, defines "prurient interest" as:
a lustful interest in sexual stimulation or gratification. In determining whether
sexually explicit matter appeals to the prurient interest, the matter shall be judged
with reference to average 17-year-old minors. If it appears from the character of the
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only applies to billboards that are within a specified distance-perhaps
1,000 feet away-from locations where children are likely to be present,
such as schools, parks and playgrounds.
These two steps, when taken together, would be far more permissive
of speech than the Michigan legislation that passed the state Senate in
August 2009. Why? Because the first step would permit much more
imagery than simply a company's trademark, while the second step would
only restrict harmful-to-minors imagery on billboards located where minors
are likely to be present. In brief, when these two steps are viewed
collectively, the fit of the law is more reasonable under Central Hudson. 324
Ultimately, the problems plaguing laws targeting billboards for SOBs
will continue to be resolved by courts in the coming years. Oklahoma, for
instance, adopted an SOB-billboard law in 2006 that is ripe for judicial
challenge. 325 Yet, from a cultural perspective, perhaps legislators should
take a step back and realize that sexual imagery is all around us. In 2003,
for instance, a three-story billboard with an image of adult film star Jenna
Jameson appeared in New York City. 326 That, in and of itself-in the
opinion of the author-should give legislators pause when they target text-
only billboards like those of the Lion's Dens stores that were impacted by
the laws in both South Carolina and Kansas.
While lawmakers like Missouri's Matt Bartle and Michigan's Tupac
Hunter might want to shield children from the realities of adult stores and
sex toys, they seem to forget that we live in a world where very young girls
matter that it is designed to appeal to the prurient interest of a particular group of
persons, including, but not limited to, homosexuals or sadomasochists, then the
matter shall be judged with reference to average 17-year-old minors within the
particular group for which it appears to be designed.
Id. § 722.674(c).
324. Abilene Retail, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1191; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 566-
71(1980).
325. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.55 (2009). The Oklahoma law provides, in relevant part,
that:
no billboard or other exterior advertising sign for an adult cabaret or sexually
oriented business shall be located within one (1) mile of any state highway. If such
a business is located within one (1) mile of a state highway, the business may
display a maximum of two exterior signs on the premises of the business,
consisting of one identification sign and one sign solely giving notice that minors
are not permitted on the premises. The identification sign shall be no more than
forty (40) square feet in size and shall include no more than the following
information: name, street address, telephone number, and operating hours of the
business.
Id.
326. See Bob Baker, Pushing Porn to the Fore, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at El
(describing "a three-story billboard of por queen Jenna Jameson [that] looks down upon family-
friendlier Times Square").
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take sexually provocative photographs of themselves and then send them to
boys and/or post them online.327 University of Iowa Professor M. Gigi
Durham observes in her 2008 book, The Lolita Effect, that today "sexuality
marks preadolescence and childhood" 328 and "children as young as eight
report [being] worr[ied] about being popular with the opposite sex; first-
graders describe being sexually harassed by classmates; and by middle
school, kids are steeped in sexual jargon, images and exploration.,
329
Durham contends that "[i]ncreasingly, very young girls are becoming
involved in a sphere of fashion, images, and activities that encourage them
to flirt with a decidedly grown-up eroticism and sexuality-and the girls
playing with these ideas are getting younger and younger every year." 
330
Indeed, there has been a "cultural drift toward revealing clothing even on
very young girls, a trend sometimes referred to as 'prosti-tots."' 33 ' All of
this is simply to suggest that perhaps there are more real and more pressing
problems than billboards for lawmakers and parents to worry about when it
comes to minors, sex, and sexuality.
Finally, there is the issue of money. It takes a significant amount of
legal funds to challenge the billboard ordinances, and independent SOB
owners may not be able to take up the battle due to a lack of fiscal
resources. It is fortunate, then, from a pro-First Amendment perspective,
that the Lion's Den chain, which has been described as "the Wal-Mart of
porn stores," 332 apparently has the monetary resources to fight the
battles. 333 In brief, the small businesspeople-the owners of the proverbial
mom-and-pop stores-are not likely to be able to afford the cost of taking
on state and local governments that limit billboard advertising; rather, it
will be left largely to major operations like the Lion's Den and perhaps
327. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide:
Inside the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2009)
(analyzing the legal issues raised by the phenomenon of "sexting," and featuring an interview
with an individual who is now classified as a sex offender for engaging in sexting when he was
18 years old).
328. M. GIGI DURHAM, THE LOLITA EFFECT: THE MEDIA SEXUALIZATION OF YOUNG
GIRLS AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 65 (2008).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 21.
331. David N. Dunkle, Competence & Cleavage: Businesswomen Wonder What TV
Reveals About Them, PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 20, 2008, at G3.
332. Fox Special Report With Brit Hume: Senator McCain to Propose Legislation Banning
527 Groups Contrary to Democrats and Republican Who Oppose the Ban; Hard-Core Porn
Shops Move into Small Towns as More Americans Become Aware of Sex Materials (Fox News
Network broadcast Dec. 10, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
333. See About Our Company, The Lion's Den, supra note 9.
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Larry Flynt's growing chain of Hustler Hollywood stores. 3 The same
fiscal issues, however, are not quite as problematic when it comes to
cigarette companies fighting billboard restrictions on tobacco advertising.
The plaintiffs, for instance, in Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United
States, filed in August 2009, include the nation's second, third and fourth
largest tobacco companies. 
The bottom line is that the adult entertainment and cigarette industries
are not the kind of business enterprises that generate a lot of public
sympathy when it comes to protecting the First Amendment. It is doubtful
one will ever see the bumper stickers "I'm a Pro-Porn Voter" or "Hope,
Change, and Porn." For now, then, the battles waged over free speech on
billboards along the nation's highways are relatively lonely ones carried on
by businesses marginalized by social norms and mores. The tobacco case
of Commonwealth Brands is likely to generate far more mainstream news
media attention, given it is a federal law at stake that targets a high-profile
industry, but Big Tobacco likely won't find many friends of the court
taking its side as it uses the First Amendment to peddle a product that
causes cancer.
334. There are Hustler Hollywood retail stores located in California, Florida, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee and Washington. See Locations: Huslter Hollywood,
http://www.hustlerhollywood.com/index.php?main page=page&id=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
The stores, the first of which opened in 1998 on Sunset Boulevard in California, are designed to
be a "bright, refreshing alternative to the seedy adult bookstore." About: Hustler Hollywood,
http://www.hustlerhollywood.com/index.php?mainpage=page&id=6 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
335. Commonwealth Brands Complaint, supra note 57, at 5-7 (identifying the plaintiffs in
the case, including R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, the second-largest tobacco manufacturer in
the United States; Lorillard Tobacco Company, the third-largest tobacco manufacturer in the
United States; and Commonwealth Brands, Inc., the fourth-largest tobacco manufacturer in the
United States).
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